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THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
PAUL R. VERKUIL*
The independent agency has been around for 100 years now, but we
are still trying to understand how it best relates to the administration of
government. Its popularity as an organizational mechanism is more a
function of competing political forces within the legislative and executive
branches than of any systematic analysis of its effectiveness. Yet one can
discern reasons why independent agencies might be superior mechanisms
for administering government programs if their structure and purpose
are analyzed functionally. This essay proposes to do that and, in the
process, reach some conclusions about both the potential and the limits
of the independent agency as a vehicle for making government decisions.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE INDEPENDENT AGENCY PUZZLE
Ironically, it was during the New Deal period, the golden age of the
independent agency, that its weaknesses were eloquently exposed. Even
while important new independent agencies were being established with
legislative and executive cooperation (such as the Civil Aeronautics
Board, Federal Communications Commission, National Labor Relations
Board and Securities and Exchange Commission), President Roosevelt
was being advised by the Brownlow Committee to place the independent
agencies under executive departments in order to manage administrative
policymaking. The vivid words of that Committee refer to the independ-
ent agency as a "headless fourth branch of government." 1 The purpose
of Louis Brownlow's efforts was to restore to President Roosevelt greater
control over the regulatory state his administration had virtually in-
vented. The Committee concluded:
The independent commissions present a serious immediate problem.
No administrative reorganization worthy of the name can leave hang-
ing in the air more than a dozen powerful, irresponsible agencies free
* President and Professor of Law and Government, The College of William and Mary. I
would like to thank Jeff Lubbers for his many thoughtful suggestions.
1. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, REPORT wrrH SPECIAL STUDIES 37
(1937) (known as the Brownlow Report). The "fourth branch" image has become the standard way
of describing the bureaucracy, not just the independent agencies, in most standard textbooks as well
as in judicial opinions. See, eg., Process Gas Producers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of
Am., 463 U.S. 1216, 1218-19 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); J. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTrUTION 153
& n.77 (1986).
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to determine policy and administer law. Any program to restore our
constitutional ideal of a fully coordinated Executive Branch responsi-
ble to the President must bring within the reach of that responsible
control all work done by these independent commissions which is not
judicial in nature. That challenge cannot be ignored.2
As a practical matter, it has been. Brownlow's trenchant criticism
has been spectacularly unpersuasive. In the fifty years since it was first
rendered, and despite other studies that have echoed its sentiments,3 little
has been done to control independent agencies. 4 Independent agencies
continue to be created by Congress in recent years with as much fre-
quency as they were in the past (consider, for example, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Com-
modity Future Trading Commission). They remain as popular a regula-
tory format as executive agencies or the executive departments
themselves, even though movements, such as deregulation, have modified
their missions and influence (the ICC and CAB are examples). But while
they remain surprisingly resilient and resistant to congressional or execu-
tive reorganization, there are recent legislative initiatives that question
whether the independent agency structure is the best way to organize
management functions.5 This activity makes this a propitious time to
study the rationale behind the independent agency idea.
What is lacking in the creation of independent agencies is any at-
tempt in the legislative history to explain why Congress (or the President,
for that matter) preferred one organizational format over the other. New
agency structures often appear to be created in a vacuum or almost by
random selection. Only in a few cases has consideration been given to
the choice of executive versus independent format, and those exceptional
situations involve rethinking organizational choices previously made.
6
That becomes a fascinating question to pursue. Why does Congress
choose to place a new regulatory mission in an independent agency
rather than an executive one? What are the factors that go into the
2. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 40-41.
3. In 1971, a report prepared for President Nixon by a council headed by Roy Ash picked up
the management and accountability themes (as well as the fourth branch analogy) of the Brownlow
Committee, but its recommendations have fared no better. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON EXECUTIVE ORG., REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 14-15
(1971).
4. During the Carter and Reagan administrations, attempts have been made to have OMB
coordinate agency rulemaking, but independent agencies have been treated gingerly in that regard,
with respect paid to their independent status. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESI-
DENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING IN REGULATORY AGENCIES (1987); Verkuil, Jawboning
Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 943 (1980);
Infra notes 34-35.
5. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
6. See supra note 4.
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choice and can they tell us why independent agencies are useful as well as
popular institutions?
Lacking a readily discernible congressional explanation of why these
choices are made, a rationale must be supplied to help explicate the
structural qualities that render independent agencies efficient or ineffi-
cient decisionmaking mechanisms. In making this inquiry I want to look
beyond the simplistic answer that Congress prefers independent agencies
because they are independent and thereby tip control over the bureau-
cracy in the direction of Congress and away from the President. While it
is certainly true that these agencies are considered "arms of Congress ' 7
in ways that executive agencies are not, this observation proves little. If
it were a controlling rationale, we could expect all agencies to be in-
dependent, or at least be the subject of overt power struggles between
Congress and the President. But that is not the case.
Independent agencies are seen as solutions to organizational
problems that are themselves not well articulated. Until they are it is
difficult to draw any reliable conclusions about the persistent nature of
this venerable institution. To answer these questions in some reasonable
compass, I propose to identify the qualities of independent agencies that
distinguish them from other forms of bureaucratic organization and then
to relate those qualities to the various functions that administrators must
perform. By seeking to match up the organizational strengths of these
entities with the roles Congress, the Executive and the Constitution per-
mit them to play, we might come closer to calculating the value they add
to our administrative decision system (as well as understanding the orga-
nizational confusion they engender). From there, an assessment might
be ventured as to how well the independent agencies fulfill expectations
in practice and how their missions might be changed to improve their
performance.
II. ASSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
The quality that most distinguishes independent agencies from the
executive variety is the notion of independence itself. This characteristic
is based largely upon three statutory arrangements: the bipartisan ap-
pointment requirement; the fixed term requirement; and the requirement
that removal be limited to express causes.8 Taken together these qualifi-
cations distinguish independent officials from executive ones. The re-
7. See 5 SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION: REGULA-
TORY ORGANIZATION, S. Doc. No. 91, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977). The Senate study quotes
Senator Hart as follows: "The commissions, if I may risk an oversimplification, are ours." Id.
8. Terms vary from agency to agency. FCC Commissioners, for example, serve seven years.
47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (1982). The usual removal clause states: "[A]ny commissioner may be removed
Vol. 1988:257]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1988:257
quirement that the President appoint some commissioners of the party
out of power or who are politically "independent" is designed to isolate
those decisionmakers from politics. Indeed, this is a remarkable require-
ment, at least in theory, when it is considered that the appointment of
federal judges, who are meant to be our most independent officials, bears
no such onus of political balance.9 The term of years requirement com-
plements the desire for independence by establishing staggered terms that
usually extend beyond a President's four-year term of office. 10 Finally,
the limitation of removal to designated causes ensures that a President
will not be able to discipline an official for purely political reasons, or for
no reason at all.11 These provisions do much to give independent agen-
cies their distinctive character, but they are not all that do so.
Another distinguishing characteristic of independent agencies is
their organization. They are predominantly commissions or boards, not
single decisionmakers.12 They are collegial bodies. That is another qual-
ity that distinguishes them from most executive agencies1 3 and from all
cabinet departments. Collegial decisionmaking has far different purposes
and effects from single (or executive) decisionmaking. It is meant to be
consensual, reflective and pluralistic. It expresses shared opinions rather
than decisive ukases. In this sense, collegial bodies express deeply felt
values about the decisional process. They are more concerned with the
by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982)
(ITC).
9. The Bork nomination fight can be read two ways on that score: either as the triumph of
politics over reason or as the triumph of reason over politics. The way one views it depends upon
one's political outlook, but either way there was no expectation that Judge Bork should have been
either a Democrat or a political independent.
10. Federal Reserve Board members, for example, serve the unusually long term of 14 years.
12 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
11. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
12. It is not an obviously easy task to find an "official" list of independent agencies. One is
contained in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations, published by OMB's Regulation Informa-
tion Service Center. 53 Fed. Reg. 13,602 (1988). It lists 14 independent agencies as follows: Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission; Consumer Product Safety Commission; Farm Credit
Administration; Federal Communications Commission; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; Federal Home Loan Bank Board; Federal Maritime Com-
mission; Federal Reserve System; Federal Trade Commission; Interstate Commerce Commission;
National Credit Union Administration; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and Securities and Ex-
change Commission. All but two of those organizations (Farm Credit Administration and National
Credit Union Administration) are commissions or boards. See also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (1982)
(listing 17 independent agencies).
13. In the same Regulatory Information Service Center listing there are several commissions
and boards included under the heading "Executive Agencies": Architectural and Transportation
Barriers Compliance Board; Commission on Civil Rights; Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion; Merit Systems Protection Board; Panama Canal Commission; and Railroad Retirement Board.
But these are organizationally in the minority; there are 20 executive agencies that are single-headed.
Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 13,602 (1988).
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values of fairness, acceptability and accuracy than with the single dimen-
sion of efficiency.
When the three qualities of independence are added in (namely bi-
partisan appointments, terms of years and for cause removal 4), it be-
comes clear the independent agencies emulate our most revered collegial
bodies-the courts, or, more precisely, the appellate courts.15 Judicial
independence is of course a study unto itself but the analogy to adminis-
trative commissions is a compelling one. As Martin Shapiro has pointed
out, the courts (in the Anglo-American setting) secured independence
first from the king (the executive) and then from Parliament.1 6 The
courts' success in doing so (testified to in article III of the Constitution)
has its closest administrative analogue in the independent agency. It was
emulation of the appellate courts that allowed the first independent
agency, the ICC, to gain the legitimacy necessary to introduce the twen-
tieth-century administrative state.17
Appellate decisionmaking in the judicial setting involves group de-
liberation. This has meaning at several levels: it promises greater accu-
racy (and thereby fairness) because of the dialectical nature of the
deliberative process. Arguments are presented that must be refuted or
accepted, a process that can exist only in the group rather than solitary
setting.18 Moreover, research on the impact of multiple versus single de-
ciders suggests that the group decision will tend toward consensus in dis-
parate cases, whereas those same deciders sitting alone might produce
more widely dispersed results.' 9 There is, in other words, an empirical
dimension to the proposition that group decisionmaking results in com-
promises toward the middle position. From this, one can also conclude
that group decisionmaking has a value in helping to achieve more consis-
tent results in difficult factual situations, such as those that occur in the
14. See supra text accompanying note 8.
15. M. SHAPIRO, COURTS-A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 111-115 (1981).
16. Id. at 112.
17. That the respected constitutional authority and Michigan Supreme Court Judge Thomas
Cooley headed the ICC at its inception had much to do with its acceptance. See J. ROHR, supra note
1, at 90-113.
18. See Jones, Multitude of Counselors: Appellate Adjudication as Group Decision-Making 54
TUL. L. REv. 541 (1980). Harry Jones concludes "that blazing originality and boldness of social
vision are less significant in the work of the courts than the more sober intellectual virtues: detach-
ment; critical judgment; and patient willingness to listen, to pay genuine attention, to the orders and
arguments of others." Id. at 553.
19. A study of Social Security Administrative Law Judge (AU) disability decisions analyzed
certain dominant decision factors and revealed that three-person AU panels tended to decide the
same cases with less variability than single ALJs. The extreme ends of the decisional spectrum were
cut off by the use of panel decisions. See J. MASHAW, W. SCHWARZ, C. GOETZ, P. VERKUIL & F.
GOODMAN, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 20-29 (1978).
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complex world of disability decisionmaking. 20
If these qualities are associated with appellate courts and judges,
then, if the analogy holds, they should also be associated with independ-
ent agencies and commissioners. The reflective, consensual nature of the
group decision process is best suited to decisions that are factual in na-
ture, where accuracy is an important but often elusive goal. When it
comes to executive policy type decisions, those activities designed to im-
plement broad programs or to urge modifications in social behavior, sin-
gle deciders who can act decisively are better suited to the task.21 In
those circumstances, the goal is to improve society in some overall sense,
not to ensure justice in the individual case. Consensus building can be
frustrating and counterproductive in this setting. What is needed are de-
ciders who can act and be held accountable for their activities. Hence
the important distinction between judicial and executive decisions has
long been part of our society. If that distinction is not obvious, simply
remember that when the Founders established the executive branch dur-
ing the constitutional period, they rejected a plural executive (or commis-
sion approach) in favor of a single executive largely on this basis.22
Adjudication and policymaking call for different skills and temperaments
as well as different organizational mechanisms.
Another quality of independent commissions that relates to collegi-
ality is the nature of their jurisdiction. Unlike courts, commissions have
jurisdiction over limited types of subject matter; they are called upon to
decide complex or routine matters on a repetitive basis. 23 Independent
agencies develop an expertise with the subject matter that, in the ideal
world, also makes their more reflective decisionmaking cost-efficient.
When Congress selects industries or segments of the economy for regula-
tion and builds agencies around them, it expects the deciders to obtain
expertise. Transportation, banking, financial markets, consumer and
workplace safety, communications, labor relations and nuclear energy
20. The medical and vocational evidence necessary to establish an SSA disability claim is fre-
quently perplexing both for the ALJs and the federal district courts. In this setting consistency of
result is often the best surrogate for the elusive standard of accuracy. Id at 10-12. The Veterans
Administration employs three-person teams (Rating Boards) that make initial disability determina-
tions, as well as an appellate body (Board of Veterans Appeals). Individual VA decisions are exempt
from judicial review because of a congressionally expressed desire to achieve "uniformity."
21. The first Hoover Commission put the matter succinctly: "The very qualities which make
these agencies valuable for regulation, especially group deliberation and discussion, make them un-
suited for executive and operating responsibilities." U.S. COMM'N ON ORG. OF TiE ExEcUTIVE
BRANCH OF Gov'T, COMM. ON INDEP. REGULATORY COMM'Ns, A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (1949).
22. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
23. This is certainly not an exclusive characteristic of independent agencies; executive ones
(notably the benefactory agencies such as the SSA and VA) share it as well.
[Vol. 1988:257
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
have been selected for independent agency supervision with this thought
in mind. There is no reason why other problems, such as the environ-
ment or the regulation of prescription drugs, could not have been simi-
larly directed.24 Once the choice of independent agency format has been
made, the agency is obliged to become expert in identifying and solving
the problems presented if it wants to survive congressional oversight.
Selecting commissioners with relevant experience and asking them
to concentrate on cases that arise in their field gives them an edge that
generalist judges cannot and are not meant to have. This characteristic
in effect becomes a way of distinguishing agencies from courts as well as
an indicator of administrative rather than judicial jurisdiction. In a re-
cent study by the Council on the Role of the Courts that tried to identify
the activities that courts perform best, "repetitive or administrative ques-
tions" were indicators of nonjudicial resolution.25 The qualities of deci-
sional independence, collegial decisionmaking, and subject matter
expertise are all indicators of independent agency status. Only the first
two characteristics relate exclusively to that kind of agency, but when
combined with the third they produce a conceptual framework. Having
identified these features of the independent agency, it is now possible to
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of these agencies in terms of the
decisionmaking responsibilities they have been given.
III. THE FUNCTIONS OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Independent agencies conduct their business with a full range of de-
cisional techniques. They adjudicate, that is, decide contested matters,
on a case by case basis. They make policy, whether through the formal/
informal method of rulemaking, or by proclaiming standards and rules of
conduct. They also prosecute for civil violations of the statutes they ad-
minister. None of these functions is unique to independent agencies; ex-
ecutive agencies and departments employ them as well. What is unique
about independent agencies is that they perform the executive functions
of policymaking and prosecution through an organizational scheme that
was designed with the adjudicatory function in mind.
Adjudication was the primary function of the earliest independent
agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and it was a sub-
stantial part of the business of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as
well. This function is uncontroversial. The Brownlow Committee, for
all its criticism of the independent agency, explicitly endorsed the contin-
24. Indeed, Congress has often thought about making the FDA an independent agency. 5 SEN-
ATE COMM'N ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, supra note 7, at 78.




uation of its judicial-type business. 26 Today, adjudication remains a pri-
mary activity of many independent agencies, as measured by cases
processed at the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) level.27
Over the years, however, rulemaking and policy formulation have
captured an increasing percentage of agency resources. Partially this was
due to the realization at agencies such as the FTC and Federal Power
Commission (FPC) that rules were a more efficient method of controlling
regulated entities than the incremental, time-consuming adjudicatory ap-
proach.2 8 This "more bang for the buck" theory of the 1960s and 1970s
transformed many regulatory agencies from adjudicators to policymak-
ers.29 While some independent agencies, such as the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB), still preferred to proceed on a case-by-case
basis,30 the prevailing mode of administration became rule-oriented once
the power to proceed "informally" became accepted. This kind of
rulemaking, which grew out of adjudication and has express support in
the Administrative Procedural Act (APA),31 was a decisional technique
that actually gave the agencies a functional advantage over the courts,
who engage in the practice without the benefit of a rulemaking process.
But in the 1970s several agencies began to utilize the rulemaking process
to launch wide-ranging inquiries into social and business behavior that
were not supplemented by underlying adjudicative investigations. Agen-
cies such as the FTC and FCC came into conflict with industries, Con-
gress and ultimately the courts. 32 Concern for coordinating regulatory
policy through the executive branch revived and the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) became a major force in the rulemaking pro-
cess. 33 OMB opened what has been called a "Pandora's box of issues
centering on rulemaking authority and power."'34
26. See supra text accompanying note 2.
27. See Lubbers, FederalAgency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest and the Trees, 31 FED.
B. NEws & J. 383 (1984).
28. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4
(1985).
29. See, ag., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973) (FDA);
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) (FPC).
30. And for this persistence, the NLRB has long been criticized. See Estrecher, Policy Oscilla-
tion at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REv. 163 (1985).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
32. Congress reacted with a bill, introduced by Senator Bumpers, designed to eliminate all
judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations. S. 111, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced, 125
CONG. REC. 737 (1979).
33. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979) (Carter); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1982) (Reagan); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986) (Reagan); see also ABA
COMM'N ON LAW & THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM (1979) (advo-
cating legislation to achieve presidential reversal of agency regulations).
34. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 4, at iii.
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The popularity of the rulemaking technique by independent agencies
raises an issue central to this essay. Rulemaking challenges the organiza-
tional theory behind the independent agency itself. These agencies can
become policy knight-errants outside the framework of the executive
branch. This tendency to go it alone is a natural consequence of creating
an organization, some of whose members are selected for their political
neutrality, with fixed terms of office. Moreover, the model of consensual
decisionmaking is ill-suited to receiving and implementing policy direc-
tives. Given the need for the President to control policy as part of his
constitutional duties pursuant to article II, independence and collegiality
are being seen increasingly as qualities counterproductive to the rulemak-
ing function. Consider that attempts to subject independent agency
rulemaking to OMB control have foundered politically, even though
there is a sound constitutional basis for the assertion of executive
power.35
To some extent the executive branch has overcome the indepen-
dence problem by giving more powers to the chairpersons of independent
agencies. Over the years a variety of presidentially inspired reorganiza-
tion plans have transferred powers over the agencies' budget, hiring and
priority-setting to the Chair,36 who is usually subject to appointment by
the President.37 This enhanced power of the Chair, which is commented
on in this symposium by Glen Robinson, 38 cuts two ways in terms of
making collegial agencies more effective policy instruments. At the same
time that it increases responsiveness, it undermines collegiality. 39 By
35. See Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38
ADMIN. L. REv. 181 (1986). There have also been countercharges leveled at OMB for displacing
congressionally mandated policy responsibilities of even executive agencies like EPA. See Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986); Morrison, OMB Interference with
Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986).
36. See, e.g., Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1961, 26 Fed. Reg. 6191 (1961), reprinted in 74 Stat. 837
(1961) (Federal Trade Commission); Reorg. Plan No. 6 of 1961, 26 Fed. Reg. 7541 (1961), reprinted
in 75 Stat. 838 (1961) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board); Reorg. Plan No. 8 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg.
3175 (1950), reprinted in 64 Stat. 1264 (1950) (Federal Trade Commission); Reorg. Plan No. 9 of
1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (1950), reprinted in 64 Stat. 1265 (1950) (Federal Power Commission);
Reorg. Plan No. 10 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (1950), reprinted in 64 Stat. 1265 (1950) (Securities
and Exchange Commission); Reorg. Plan No. 13 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3176 (1950), reprinted in 64
Stat. 1266 (1950) (Civil Aeronautics Board).
37. The President can usually remove the Chair (as Chair) without ascribing cause, which gives
him greater control over the agency leadership (an exception is the Federal Reserve Board). More-
over, when a President has been in office for a while, and certainly in the case of President Reagan's
second term, the ability to appoint all of the members of the commissions should enhance the Presi-
dent's control over collegial agencies.
38. See Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative, 1988
DuKE L.J. 238.
39. Discussions with the Chairs of several independent agencies lead me to believe that they feel
themselves beleaguered and isolated from their members (even though the members have been ap-
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pushing executive rulemaking priorities at the expense of the collegiality
needed for effective adjudicatory decisionmaking, the primary function of
regulatory commissions is undermined. In this circumstance, one won-
ders whether centralizing power in the office of the Chair is not an at-
tempt to make collegial agencies something they are not-single-headed
agencies. This raises the further inquiry whether the function (poli-
cymaking through rulemaking4") might not itself be misplaced in in-
dependent agencies.
The third function independent agencies are called upon to perform
is also inherently executive: that of prosecuting violations of agency stat-
utes or rules. This power is the subject of much recent attention due to
the independent prosecutor case4" and to a constitutional challenge to the
power's exercise by the FTC.42 While I have defended, in earlier pages of
this journal, 43 the constitutionality of the exercise of combined functions
by the independent agencies, I remain open to a prudential argument
against the exercise by collegial bodies of this executive function. Even if
it is constitutional, one may fairly ask: is this function necessary to the
work of independent agencies and does it enhance or detract from their
primary mission and purpose?
While it is possible to erect Chinese walls and employ protocols that
satisfy the APA separation-of-functions requirements and due process, is
it worth it? I have my doubts. Public acceptance of the independent
agency (indeed of administration in general) has long foundered on the
rock of combined prosecutor and judge.44 Modifications in the
pointed by the same president) because they are held accountable for policies not the agencies' own.
Even commissioners of the same party develop independent bases of support (from the industries
they regulate, the public, or Congress) that often conflict with executive branch initiatives. It is hard
not to conclude that powerful Chairs are not the solution to coordinated policymaking by independ-
ent agencies.
40. Here one must draw a difficult distinction between rulemaking based upon adjudication
(what might be called court-like rulemaking) and rulemaking that is pure policy execution (as in
standard setting). The difference is important because the adjudicatory function is frequently ad-
vantaged by rules that explain the process of enforcement. This would include, for example,
rulemaking by the NLRB, which Professor Estrecher refers to in what he calls the "policy reversal
context" of previously decided cases. See Estrecher, supra note 30, at 179. But it would not include
bold new initiatives that range far beyond existing case law.
41. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). The independent prosecutor presents a
different (and really stronger) constitutional case because of the necessity argument (i.e., indepen-
dence is needed to investigate the executive branch).
42. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'g 625 F. Supp. 747
(D.D.C. 1986). Plaintiffs contended that the independence of the FTC (via the "for cause" removal
process) frees FTC prosecutors from executive control and is therefore unconstitutional. 625 F.
Supp. at 748. The case has likely been mooted by Morrison v. Olson.
43. Verkuil, The Status of Independent AgenciesAfter Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.L 779.
44. One of the best Commissioners of the FTC, Philip Elman, surely echoed prevailing senti-
ments when he observed years ago: "[Tihe strongest argument I would make against agency adjudi-
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prosecutorial power could be made without jeopardizing the missions of
independent agencies. The experience of the NLRB with a general coun-
sel who is separately subject to presidential appointment45 might be a
model worth emulating by agencies like the FTC and SEC. In any event,
the prosecutorial power, like the power to make broad-based legislative
rules, tends to complicate the independent agencies' functions in a way
that detracts from its primary organizational mission of adjudication.
IV. MATCHING FORM AND FUNCTION: REDESIGNING THE
INDEPENDENT AGENCY
The foregoing discussion suggests that there is a mismatch between
the characteristics or organizational form of independent agencies and
the decisionmaking functions they are called upon to perform. There are
undoubtedly good historical reasons why the agencies evolved to their
present state, but that should not bar a reconceptualization of their role.
Indeed, as has been shown, attempts have been made to do that ever
since the independent agency blossomed during the New Deal. It is not
that the independent agency has no clothes, but that its garments need
alteration.
The independent agency is designed to emulate the appellate courts.
When its focus is expanded to include rulemaking in a setting that goes
beyond explaining law or adjudication, the agency confuses its form with
a function best left to more accountable (to the executive) single adminis-
trators. We want the executive to control policies within the confines of
appropriate congressional direction. In terms of the prosecution func-
tion, some (not all) independent agencies have added this executive re-
sponsibility unnecessarily. Fairness in terms of true separation of
functions can be enhanced by providing the President with at least the
power directly to appoint the agency official responsible for prosecution.
Chinese walls may work, but the system would appear to function better
cation of alleged violations of law is that the blending of prosecutorial and adjudicative powers in a
single tribunal imposes intolerable strains on fairness." Elman, A Modest Proposal for Radical Re-
form, 56 A.B.A. J. 1045, 1048 (1970). It should be noted that Commissioner Elman's solution was
to end the adjudicative responsibilities of the FTC, make it a policy-based single-headed agency and
transfer the adjudicative responsibilities to a trade court that would prosecute cases brought by the
new agency. This deconstruction of the FTC anticipates some of the suggestions offered here. See
infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
45. The General Counsel of the NLRB is an independent official appointed for a four-year term
by the President. He or she has final authority to investigate and prosecute before the NLRB, which
is also an independent agency. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982). To the degree that the NLRB eschews
rulemaking, see supra note 30 and accompanying text, this arrangement comes close to splitting the
functions discussed in the next section.
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if the loyalties of the deciders and prosecutors were more clearly
delineated.
The shearing of functions leaves the independent agency with a
more tightly fitted garment. But does it reduce the agency's effectiveness
and is it impractical? Some recent lessons are worth reviewing before
those questions are answered. Indeed, once they are answered, it is fair
to ask an additional question: does a refocused independent agency pro-
vide a superior model for the adjudicatory functions that are currently
performed by executive agencies and departments?
A. The "'Split-Function" Model: Lessons from OSHA and MSHA.
The idea of an independent agency tailored to the adjudicatory func-
tion and linked to an executive agency that exercises policymaking and
prosecution responsibilities need not be invented; it exists already in at
least two statutes administered by the Department of Labor, an executive
department. The Department's Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) has responsibility for setting and enforcing health and
safety standards.46 Challenges to OSHA's standard enforcement are ad-
judicated before a three-member independent agency, the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). A similar arrange-
ment exists for mine safety and health, where the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) sets and enforces safety and health standards
and the independent, five-member Federal Mine Safety and Health Re-
view Commission (FMSHRC) adjudicates them.4 7
These innovative arrangements are the product of political compro-
mise that overcame an attempt to give all three functions (rulemaking,
prosecution and adjudication) directly to the Secretary of Labor (or his/
her designate).48 Senator Javits is given credit for working the compro-
mise that brought an independent agency into an executive department
to satisfy what he labeled "traditional notions of due process."'49 The
Senator undoubtedly used this phrase for its rhetorical value, since due
process dictates have long been satisfied by a commingling of functions.50
But this coordinated independent/executive agency arrangement en-
hances the appearance if not the reality of fairness. The idea of an in-
dependent agency within an executive department gained further
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
47. 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1982).
48. See H.R. 843, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., introduced, 113 CONG. REc. 112 (1967).
49. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5177, 5218.
50. Administrative combination-of-functions arrangements at both the federal and state levels
have survived judicial challenge. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S, 389 (1971).
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expansion when the independent and free-standing FPC (as the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERO)) was placed within the Depart-
ment of Energy in 1978.51 That compromise has been hailed as a new
model of agency organization,5 2 but it has yet to gain further adherents.
It is easy to draw up a new approach to regulatory management
without considering the downsides to the split-function idea. In terms of
OSHRC and FMSHRC the most difficult area of accommodation has
been deciding the appropriate roles of the Secretary and the Commis-
sions in the interpretation of rules.53 While the Secretary retains respon-
sibility for rulemaking, the rules themselves often must be interpreted in
adjudication. In this context, the courts have had to decide whether to
defer to the interpretations offered by the Secretary. One commentator
describes these "turf fights" between the Secretary and the review com-
missions, especially OSHA/OSHRC, as inherent in the split-function
arrangement. 54
But turf battles exist in all agencies, whether "split" functionally or
not. The advantages of the split-function approach must be stated in
abstract terms: the purpose of collegial agencies is to adjudicate. Inde-
pendence legitimizes adjudicatory agencies. If splitting functions be-
tween an executive department and an independent commission
coincides with organization strengths, it should carry with it substantial
benefits in the perception of fairness. It is most helpful that experience
with coordinate independent agencies already exists within the Depart-
ment of Labor on a variety of fronts, as well as in the Department of
Energy. The benefit of extending that experience to other agencies, exec-
utive and independent, ought to be explored by Congress. The hypothe-
sis of this essay is that it makes sense conceptually; what needs to be
determined is how to make it work in practice.
51. Byse, The Department of Energy Organization Act. Structure and Procedure, 30 ADMIN. L.
REv. 193 (1978). As Professor Byse notes, however, the mere placement of FERC within DOE did
not effect a change in the rulemaking and policymaking powers that independent agency had previ-
ously enjoyed when it was the FPC. Id. at 208-10.
52. See 5 SENATE COMM. ON GoV'T AFFAIRS, supra note 7.
53. See Donovan v. A. Amorello & Sons, Inc., 761 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Donovan v.
Daniel Marr & Son Co., 763 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1985) (supporting but qualifying the Secretary's
authority). But see Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974) (favoring
OSHRC's interpretation of a rule over OSHA's). See generally Johnson, The Split-Enforcement
Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 315 (1987).
This conflict should come as no surprise since it is at the sensitive juncture between the executive and
judicial functions.
54. Johnson, supra note 53, at 340, 347. Professor Johnson is unable to conclude that the split-
function/enforcement model is superior to the traditional unitary model. Id. at 348.
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B. Administrative Courts and the Role of Administrative Law Judges.
If the experiments mentioned above are to become more general in
application, independent agencies may become what they might well
have been considered all along-administrative or article I courts. In a
useful article, Susan Sommer has made a persuasive case for identifying
independent agencies as article I courts. 5" As creatures of Congress,
these institutions are best seen as judicial analogues, which of course
serves also to isolate their policymaking and prosecutorial roles.5 6 As a
practical matter, the reference to administrative courts revives an old
theme in administrative law that would place all agency adjudication
within a separate administrative court system.57 The difficulty with the
separate administrative court idea is that it moves the adjudicatory func-
tion too far from the agencies where the business is generated; as a result
it contradicts the need for specialization that led to the creation of ad-
ministrative agencies in the first place.
The argument for administrative courts of general jurisdiction is
largely based on lightening the judicial review burden in the federal
courts.5 8 This goal could also be achieved in an administrative court sys-
tem that is limited in scope to the specific agency whose business it re-
views. This step would be less controversial and would not preclude
future consideration of whether a generalized article I administrative
court (or courts) would have organizational or prestige advantages that
outweigh the expertise benefits of agency-specific courts.
In a sense this debate parallels that currently involving ALJs who
are seeking legislation to organize as a "corps" with more general duties
extending beyond specific agency assignments. 59 While the legislation
does not address the larger issue of whether ALJs and their decisions
55. Sommer, Independent Agencies as Article One Tribunals Foundations of a Theory of
Agency Independence, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (1987); see also Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Adminis-
trative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 928 (1988) ("[T]here is... no difference in
constitutional principle between legislative courts and administrative agencies.").
56. Ms. Sommer concedes that equating independent agencies with article I courts makes their
nonadjudicatory functions more difficult to accept. Sommer, supra note 55, at 99. But on the hy-
pothesis advanced here, that may be an advantage rather than a disadvantage.
57. See, e.g., Cooper, The Proposed United States Administrative Court, 35 MICH. L. REV. 193
(1936). This idea of a single administrative court was revived in the Ash Council Report. PREsI-
DENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORG., supra note 3, at 53-55. The Ash Council re-
jected retention of adjudicatory authority within separate independent agencies on grounds both of
confusion of policy and adjudicatory roles and of an alleged diminution of attractiveness of the
separate judgeships. Id.
58. This was certainly a motivation behind the Ash Council recommendations. See ADVISORY
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORG., supra note 3, at 54.
59. See S. 950, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced, 133 CONG. REc. S4853 (daily ed. Apr. 8,
1987); Lubbers, supra note 27.
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should have greater independence from agency heads (whether independ-
ent or executive) 6° that issue inevitably comes up when the independent
commission as an administrative court is considered. The corps concept,
which has been around for a while, seeks to divide ALJs into eight
programmatic groups. That approach would have relevance to commis-
sion adjudication should it be thought desirable to consolidate the busi-
ness of independent agencies along similar lines.61
The corps concept may also have a bearing on the independence
issue. If greater independence of adjudicatory decisions is desirable at
the appellate (commission) level, it is fair to ask why it should not also be
so at the ALJ or trial level. ALJs decide matters that must ultimately be
reviewed by the various commissions or agency heads. Their indepen-
dence is a long standing controversy; it has been acknowledged in a vari-
ety of ways relating to hiring and firing. To insulate them further from
agency control would create considerable resistance. ALJ decisions cer-
tainly need not be independent of the agency in order to be reviewed by
an independent commission. Indeed, OSHRC and FMSHRC employ
their own ALJs to make initial decisions. Nonetheless, the role of ALJs,
whether reorganized in a corps or not, will continue to be a central con-
cern of any newly conceived independent agency concept that focuses
primarily on the adjudication function, since the commission format is
designed for appellate review, not trial-type initial decisions.
C. The Administrative Court and Executive Agencies.
If reorganizing the independent agency as an administrative court
with its attention primarily focused on adjudication makes sense for in-
dependent agencies, why should it not also apply to the adjudicatory
functions of executive agencies? Indeed, the largest adjudicatory agen-
cies in the federal system are executive: the Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) and the Veterans Administration (VA). Between them they
handle millions of disability disputes each year.62 Yet they function
without the benefit of any independent deciders. In the SSA there are
ALJs (660 of them in fact) but the VA utilizes three-person rating boards
whose members are not ALJs. Both agencies have review mechanisms
(the SSA's Appeals Council and the VA's Board of Veterans Appeals
(BVA)) that have none of the characteristics of independence (bipartisan
makeup, fixed terms, for cause removal) that make the independent agen-
60. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the agency decision resides with the agency head
and the AIJ renders a tentative or advisory decision only. 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1982).
61. The Ash Council Report recommended consolidation of several agencies, including the
(then) three transportation agencies (CAB, ICC, FMC).
62. See generally J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983).
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cies independent. Moreover, in the case of the VA there is no judicial
review of BVA decisions.6 3
These appellate tribunals decide thousands of cases annually in what
appears to be an efficient fashion. 64 Nevertheless, an appeals council
with final decisional authority has been suggested 65 and a BVA with deci-
sional responsibility patterned after an administrative court may have the
benefit of staving off more dramatic attempts to subject the entire veter-
ans claims process to judicial review.6 6 The advantage of an independent
tribunal within an executive agency is that it can add to the perception of
fairness and perhaps reduce the number of cases that reach the courts (in
the case of the SSA) or at least reduce the courts' tendency to reverse the
agency (on the assumption that an independent tribunal will bolster judi-
cial confidence in the fairness and accuracy of the administrative pro-
cess). 67 If fairness of the adjudicative process has equal value, there is no
reason why executive agencies should not embrace the administrative
court concept as well as independent ones. There are plenty of potential
applications beyond the disability context should this prove a concept
that the Executive and Congress find appealing.68
V. 100 YEARS OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: WHERE
To GO FROM HERE
The independent agency celebrates its 100th birthday in 1989.69 It
63. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).
64. The SSA Appeals Council and the BVA each decide over 44,000 cases per year. SSA,
EXECUTIVE HANDBOOK OF SELECTED DATA 32 (1987); 1984 VA ANNUAL REPORT 125 (1985).
65. See C. KOCH & D. KopLow, THE FOURTH BITE AT THE APPLE: A STUDY OF THE OPER-
ATION AND UTILITY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINSITRATION'S APPEALS COUNCIL (report to
the ACUS, 1988).
66. See H.R. 5039, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (proposing to convert the BVA into an article I court),
introduced, 134 CONG. REC. H5718 (daily ed. July 13, 1988); S. 11, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 134
CONG. REC. S9208 (daily ed. July 11, 1988) (passed in Senate, 86 to 11, same day as reprinted)
(providing for limited judicial review of VA disability determinations).
67. See generally J. MASHAW, supra note 62; Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986).
68. For example, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Justice (Immigration) and
the Department of Housing and Urban Development all actively adjudicate and employ AIJs who
make initial decisions without the benefit of independent commissions to review them.
69. The independent agency was born not in 1887, when the ICC was created, but in 1889,
when the ICC was removed from the Department of the Interior and granted sole authority over its
budget, personnel and internal management. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 382, 25 Stat. 855. The word
"independent" was not used in the legislation, and we are told there was no discussion of the ICC's
relationship to Congress. R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 61
(1941). Yet politics must have been in the background, we are also told, since the ICC amendment
was adopted by a democratic Congress just two days before the inauguration of Benjamin Harrison,
a republican lawyer. See 5 SENATE COMM. ON GOv'T AFFAIRS, supra note 7, at 27-28. Surely the
politics of independent agencies has not changed that much during the intervening years.
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was born without much fanfare when it emerged from an executive
agency, the Department of the Interior. What better time than now to
consider whether independent agencies might return to the executive de-
partments that spawned them? This is not a fanciful idea. The Depart-
ment of Energy contains an independent agency (FERC) and the leading
Senate study on federal regulation suggests that FERC "might serve as a
model in other areas."'70 And the OSHA and MSHA split-function mod-
els discussed above lend empirical support to the idea that the role of
independent agencies can be modified and improved over time. More-
over, there are signs that Congress is prepared to rethink the value of
independent commissions versus executive agencies based on the pros
and cons of the organizational mechanisms themselves. This is occurring
in legislative debates over the reorganization of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). A conceptual breakthrough may be on the horizon.
A. Rethinking the Value of Independence: The Case
of Nuclear Safety.
An extraordinary debate is currently taking place over the future of
nuclear safety regulation. Legislation has been drafted by Congress that
would convert the NRC, an independent commission, into a single-ad-
ministrator executive agency. 71 Congress seems willing to amputate one
of its "arms," and a majority of the members of the NRC itself favors the
idea.72 For one of the few times in legislative annals the debate is focused
on the source of the problem: the strengths and weaknesses of the in-
dependent commission as an administrative body.
The Senate Report accompanying the legislation pulls no punches in
identifying the weaknesses of a commission structure in the previously
non-adjudicative context of safety regulation:
In short, the committee has found that the Commission structure is
poorly suited to the task of regulating the commercial nuclear power
industry. As a means of formulating decisions, the Commission deci-
sionmaking process is inefficient and, frequently, indecisive .... No
single individual is responsible for a decision, once made.73
The Senate Committee did have the advantage of previous studies
70. See 5 SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRs, supra note 7, at 7.
71. See S. 2443, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (Nuclear Regulation Reorganization and Reform Act of
1988), introduced, 134 CONG. RFc. S6843 (daily ed. May 26, 1988); S. REP. No. 364, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1988).
72. See Letter from Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman of NRC, to Hon. John B. Breaux (Nov. 9,
1987) (referring to NRC testimony in favor of the single administrator concept). The Commission
did have reservations about the bill's proposed Nuclear Safety Investigations Board, discussed infra
at notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
73. S. REP. No. 364, supra note 71, at 15.
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that criticized the NRC along the same lines,74 but it nonetheless remains
an unusually incisive critique of the ability of the independent agency to
function in the non-adjudicatory setting. Safety regulation may be the
archetypal arena where decisiveness, not deliberation or consensus-build-
ing, is the value most desired.75
The Senate proposal would place nuclear safety under a single ad-
ministrator (an independent agency in the executive branch, much like
the EPA Administrator)76 who would be appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Once confirmed, the Administrator
would serve at the pleasure of the President.77 At this point, the Admin-
istrator becomes an executive official with the status and power to regu-
late nuclear safety reasonably and effectively-and, most importantly,
the President becomes responsible for nuclear safety.
One can only applaud Congress's objectivity in considering the issue
from a functional rather than a political perspective. But the congres-
sional fears of agency loyalty seem to reappear later in the legislation. In
order to ensure "independence" of investigations, a three-person Nuclear
Safety Investigations Board is established within the agency, with its
chairman separately appointed by the President, upon senatorial concur-
rence.78 The other two members are appointed by the Administrator of
the Nuclear Safety Agency. The three members serve fixed three-year
terms and are removable by the President "only for inefficiency, neglect
of duty, or malfeasance in office."' 79 That language of course rein-
troduces the independent agency into the executive agency structure.
But unlike FERC in the Department of Energy, the primary mission of
this Board is not adjudication but investigation, which is traditionally an
74. In October 1979, the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, chaired
by John Kemeny, advocated a single-administrator structure, as did a subsequent NRC Report of
the Special Inquiry Group, chaired by Mitchell Rogovin.
75. The Senate Report also reviews the legislative history to the establishment of the NRC in
1974 and concedes that the question whether the commission structure was the best mechanism was
not raised, even though in 1962 the Kennedy administration had suggested a single administrator
instead of the (then) AEC. The Senate Report conceded that earlier discussions had foundered over
the fear that a single administrator proposal "would result in an agency with less accountability to
Congress." S. REP. No. 364, supra note 71, at 3-4.
76. Id. at 16. The phrase "independent agency in the executive branch" sounds contradictory
unless one reads the word "independent" to mean "free-standing" to distinguish single administra-
tors from executive departments.
77. S. 2443, supra note 71, § 104; see also S. REP. No. 364, supra note 71, at 28 (summarizing
this provision).
78. S. 2443, supra note 71, §§ 141-145; see also S. REP. No. 364, supra note 71, at 35-40 (sum-
marizing these sections).




The reasons given for creating this independent agency within an
executive agency have to do with the conflicts of interest that could arise
from the Administrator investigating nuclear safety problems where the
agency itself may have had officials involved in the approval process.81
Senator Biden, in his testimony in favor of the independent board, em-
phasized the problem of public confidence relating to internal investiga-
tions,82 but one cannot help but wonder whether the real reason has
more to do with maintenance of some degree of congressional control
over the process. The arguments against this independent board, led by
the NRC itself, are precisely that a collegial solution was what rendered
the nuclear safety process under the NRC inefficient to begin with.83
The innovative approach to nuclear safety proposed by the Senate
deserves serious consideration, especially as it relates to the conversion of
the NRC into a more effective and responsible single administrator. It
certainly reflects the priorities for independent commissions advocated
here, since adjudication is only a small part of the NRC's business.
Moreover, it may be that the felt congressional need to maintain an in-
dependent board within this new agency to investigate nuclear incidents
could be satisfied by a variation upon the idea of for cause removal of
single administrators proposed in the next section.
B. The Politics of Independence: A Modest Proposal.
In the world of interbranch politics, if not in the real world of orga-
nizational management,8 4 the structure of regulatory agencies matters.
The "arm of Congress" view of independent agencies has successfully
thwarted executive branch attempts significantly to reorganize them for
over fifty years. It would be foolish to propose one more effort along
those lines. What is needed is a technique whereby the independent
agency can be refocused without offending deeply felt congressional pre-
80. Indeed, the Board is specifically denied authority or responsibility for regulation or enforce-
ment. See id. at 24.
81. The Nuclear Safety Investigations Board is patterned after the National Transportation
Safety Board, which investigates airline, rail and highway accidents within the Department of Trans-
portation's jurisdiction. Id. at 23.
82. See Proposals to Reorganize the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works on S. 14, S.
100, S. 908, S. 1769, and S. 1770, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1987).
83. "An independent safety board has the potential to complicate rather than simplify nuclear
regulation by further diffusing accountability and responsibility for the execution of the agency's
mission." Id. at 16 (statement of Hon. Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman of NRC); see also id. at 83
(statement of E. Lin Draper, Jr., Gulf State Utility Company) (expressing a similar view).
84. See Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack" A Skeptical View of the Importance of the
Debate, 1988 DUKE L.J. 223.
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rogatives. One way to do that is to achieve agreement that the adjudica-
tory mission of collegial agencies is the main justification for their
independence. I hope that case has been made on these pages. It has to
some degree already been accepted by influential congressional studies.85
The harder task is to convince Congress that the executive branch has it
right when it urges that policy and prosecutorial matters be given over to
single-headed administrators, whether free-standing or heads of cabinet
departments. The reluctance to do so is not based on theoretical notions
about the proper fit between form and function, but on the concern of
Congress that the executive branch will achieve hegemony over the poli-
cymaking prerogatives of the bureaucracy. It is perhaps for that reason
not surprising, as stated by an influential Senate study, that "Presidents
have generally tended toward a single administrator form, while Con-
gress has an inclination favoring multi-member commissions."'8 6
Hence my modest proposal: subject single administrators to for
cause removal limitations just like commissioners. The removal restric-
tion has been labeled by Congress as the key to the independence idea.87
Why not just extend it to single administrators who can supervise the
functions of independent agencies, including that of adjudication by ad-
ministrative courts? The administrators as presidentially selected offi-
cials would also supervise the policy and prosecutorial functions. The
independent administrator would give Congress some comfort and still
provide the decisiveness necessary for effective executive policymaking.
This may indeed be the kind of political compromise that would render
unnecessary the independent board contained in the proposed single-ad-
ministrator Nuclear Safety Agency discussed in the previous section.
An obvious argument against this compromise is its constitutional
status. I have argued elsewhere88 and won't repeat here at length, that
for cause removal can be justified even as to some cabinet officials,89
although Congress need not go that far in order to make administrators
of executive agencies removable for cause. The removal restrictions, es-
pecially if they are read to incorporate notions of failure to follow valid
85. "Independence does have its positive advantages. First and perhaps most important, these
commissions exercise quasi-judicial functions in that they adjudicate and reach decisions on particu-
lar cases." 5 SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, supra note 7, at 75.
86. Id. at 79.
87. Id. at 36 ("[T]he removal restriction is perhaps the single most important feature of regula-
tory independence.").
88. See Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule ofLaw, and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM.
& MARY L. REv. (forthcoming, 1988).
89. Congress has, for example, made new cabinet positions and changed existing ones, includ-
ing converting the Post Office into an independent corporation. For constitutional reasons, Congress




policy directions of the President,90 gain continued support from
Humphrey's Executor 91 and do not violate Buckley v. Valeo 92 or Bowsher
v. Synar. 93
Perhaps an example of this approach would prove helpful. There
are presently pending before Congress bills that seek to make the Na-
tional Park Service an independent agency.94 The plan is to place the
Park Service under the jurisdiction of a three-member review panel,
which would supervise the presidentially appointed director of the Na-
tional Park Service. The reason for this reorganization is the alleged
politicization of the park system by the Reagan administration. 95 Under-
standably, the Secretary of the Interior, Donald Hodel, regards this legis-
lation as "an old political ploy-if you can't force your political views on
an agency, then make the agency independent. '96
Under the analysis presented here the idea of a three-person review
panel (or commission) makes little sense since the predominant business
of the Park Service is policymaking, not adjudication. Where policymak-
ing is the issue, a single administrator, made independent by a for cause
removal provision as well as by presidential appointment, yet remaining
within the Department of the Interior much as FERC is within the De-
partment of Energy, would serve the Congress's needs for political inde-
pendence with a minimal disruption to the executive oversight and
coordination function. An independent administrator concept simply
makes more organizational sense in this setting as well as in the Nuclear
Safety Agency context discussed earlier.
A President may well not consider this compromise "modest," but if
not, he or she should remember that there are costs attached to removal
of executive officials like the Administrator of EPA or cabinet officers
themselves, even though no statute protects their tenure. These officials
are often powerful political figures in their own right with constituencies
in Congress and among the public. Their removal is no easy accomplish-
ment. Faced with "independent" administrators, a President might in-
90. See Pierce, Separation of Powers and the Limits of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv.
(forthcoming, 1988).
91. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
92. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
93. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Buckley prevents Congress from appointing executive officials; Bow-
sher prevents Congress from removing them. The for cause requirement, justified in Humphrey's
Executor, does not go that far; it moderates but does not eliminate the President's removal power.
This limitation gains strength from Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), which also moderates
the President's removal power.
94. See, e.g., S. 2360, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. S5398 (daily ed. May 10, 1988).
95. See Washington Talk-Would Freedom Help the National Park Service?, N.Y. Times, May




sist in return that their terms be limited to his or her four years in office,
so as to avoid the holdover official problems that might burden a Presi-
dent's second term or his or her successor's first. This kind of compro-
mise causes both branches to focus on the crux of the problem: the
proper match between form and function of independent agencies and
their alternative, the executive administrator.
C. Independent Agencies as Administrative Courts: Unbegging a Few
Hard Questions.
Even though this essay cannot anticipate all possible objections to
the approach herein suggested, several obvious difficulties need to be ad-
dressed. For one thing, if the hypothesis is correct that independent
agencies are best designed to adjudicate, how does one explain those in-
dependent agencies with limited adjudicatory functions and highly signif-
icant policymaking roles? The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) leaps to
mind. It is one of the largest, truly independent agencies (right down to
an independent Chair), but it is a policymaker of the highest order, and
only incidentally an adjudicator. By the standards posed here one would
have to conclude that the FRB is miscast as a commission and should be
restructured as a single-headed agency, perhaps with a board of policy
advisors.97 It may be that, as a practical matter, the issue has been re-
solved in this fashion anyway. Certainly the Chair of the FRB appears to
have all the powers of Chairs of the independent agencies-and more.98
But even if this possible mismatch between form and function can be
reconciled, there is another that is harder to dismiss. This is the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), which, while it adjudicates by is-
suing and denying licenses of enormous value, does most of its work in
the policy arena. Rules about ownership of stations and competition and
coverage requirements of competing modes (broadcast and cable) surely
dominate the FCC's docket. Why then should it be an independent
agency? Wouldn't a single administrator do the policy job more effec-
tively? The Senate study on regulation echoes the Ash Council 99 in urg-
97. This would make the Board itself much like the policy advisors of the FRB's Open Market
Committee, whose members, it should be noted, have been challenged because they are not all presi-
dential appointees. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1986),
aff'd, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988).
98. Indeed, the Chair of the FRB has the significant advantage over the usual independent
agency chair in that he or she is not removable except for cause. See 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
99. The Council concluded:
A single administrator for the Federal Communications Commission would be in an excep-
tionally vulnerable position which, because of its appearance, could impair public trust.
The public is entitled to assume that the information it obtains through the broadcast
media is not distorted by the political perspectives of the party in favor.
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORG., supra note 3, at 15.
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ing that the commission format is necessary in the FCC's case not
because of the independence required for adjudication but because of the
FCC's "sensitive and far reaching responsibilities." 100 If that rationale is
made part of the basis for commissions then many of the independent
agencies could justify their present format.101 But the concern with
"public trust" ought not to require a commission. What it requires is
independence and that can be achieved via the "independent administra-
tor" concept introduced above.
Another objection to the administrative court idea of independent
agencies is the potential diminution of the agencies' status and the com-
mensurate difficulty in recruiting outstanding persons to fill those split-
function positions. The Senate study on federal regulation devoted an
entire volume to the problem of recruitment and retention of better
commissioners.10 2
I have several responses. The first is of the "so what?" variety: re-
cruitment of outstanding commissioners has always been a problem, so
why should this change make a real difference? The persons sought will
of necessity be those with experience in the adjudicative process, who
may be easier to locate and retain. What they may lack in stature may be
made up for in experience and in constancy or length of service, a real
problem for all commissions. Second, maybe we don't want renaissance
public officials to serve in these posts anyway. The grander the creden-
tials of the commissioners, the greater the likelihood they will become
bold policymakers with ambitions and goals independent of the executive
branch. That may not be a good thing. Finally, if my suggestion takes
hold, recruiting an independent single administrator may be more suc-
cessful precisely because that individual will have greater executive au-
thority. One top-flight administrator may be easier to recruit than five
(or more) equally outstanding commissioners.
Surely I have just scratched the surface of hard questions that this
essay raises. I hereby beg the rest, and conclude confident that others
will decide whether there is anything here worth pursuing in greater
detail.
100. 5 SENATE COMM. ON GoV'T AFFAIRS, supra note 7, at 79.
101. Certainly the FEC engages in sensitive work, as do the SEC and other agencies.
102. 1 SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION: THE REGULA-
TORY APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, S. Doc. No. 25, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (documenting a lack
of quality and balance in the appointments of independent agency commissioners).
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